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Abstract 
 
This paper provides a critical analysis of the sentence of reparation in New Zealand, as set out by s 32 of 
the Sentencing Act 2002. The scope of the sentence is examined with particular regard to the recent 
Supreme Court decision, which limited reparation so that only victims of offences can benefit from the 
sentence. The definition of “victim”, as determined by the Sentencing Act, is confined to direct victims of 
criminal offending. Thus, any indirect victim suffering harm or loss from criminal offending cannot benefit 
from reparation. This paper questions whether that limitation gives reparation an appropriate scope, or 
whether some extension should be made so that the sentence is not restricted in its application to only 
benefit direct victims. In so doing, this paper argues that the criminal law is the suitable domain to address 
such issues of compensation and therefore, an extension of the reparation sentence is required. Alternative 
ways of limiting reparation to address this compensation issue are outlined. Ultimately it is proposed that 
an additional provision should be included within the definition of “victim”, for the purpose of s 32, so that 
indirect victims can also benefit from a sentence of reparation. 
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I Introduction 
 
This paper takes the form of an extended case note based on the recent decision of Kapa v 
R (Kapa).1 It will focus on the Supreme Court judgment, particularly the majority’s 
approach, which limited the sentence of reparation to direct victims of offences. The 
limitation resulted in two members of the public who had contributed money towards a 
reward for the recovery of stolen property being unable to benefit from a reparation 
sentence. 
 
The main considerations of this paper are how appropriate the ‘victim’ limitation is on 
the reparation sentence, and whether an extension of the provision is called for. An 
extension could make the sentence available to those outside the definition of ‘victim’ 
who have nonetheless been affected by criminal behaviour and in some way suffered 
loss. The issues to examine include whether the criminal law, through reparation, is 
suited to addressing questions of compensation for indirect victims, and what the 
possibilities are if the law is extended to do so. These will be explored with a view to 
making an informed determination as to the best way to develop reparation law in New 
Zealand. 
 
It will be shown that compensation by way of a reparation sentence should not be limited 
to those deemed to be direct ‘victims’ of criminal offending; the sentence ought to 
compensate even indirect victims who suffer some loss or harm as a result of the criminal 
behaviour. An extension of reparation beyond direct victims is easily reasoned by an 
investigation into the relevant Sentencing Act 2002 provisions2 and by looking to the 
rationales and historical background that underpin the sentence.3 The suggested 
development can also be justified by the importance of rectifying any imbalance created 
by criminal offending; that is, making right any loss or harm resulting from any criminal 
  
1 Kapa v R [2012] NZSC 1. 
2 Sentencing Act 2002, s 32. 
3 See Ministry of Justice Sentencing Policy and Guidance – A Discussion Paper (November 1997, 
Wellington) at 3.5.3. 
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conduct so that those suffering loss are reverted back to their original position.4 
Reparation serves to restore equilibrium, because the burden of any loss or harm suffered 
is transferred to the offender through the implementation of the sentence as part of the 
convicted offender’s punishment.5 Kapa provides a clear example of where the reparation 
sentence currently falls short in upholding these ideals.  
 
The prospect of extending reparation beyond direct victims does give rise to two major 
concerns. The first is whether the criminal law is the best medium to address the issue of 
compensation for indirect victims of criminal offending. There is scope to reason that 
such questions of compensation are better addressed by other legal mechanisms, or left 
entirely to civil law processes. This would require the individuals concerned to pursue 
these matters as a separate civil action, since compensation is unavailable within the 
criminal justice process. It is important to acknowledge the existence of civil 
compensation mechanisms as alternative means of redress and to understand how they 
compare to possible avenues of compensation within the criminal law. Although civil law 
mechanisms may be available in certain circumstances, it will be shown that reparation 
through the criminal law is the more suitable means by which to compensate those who 
are not ‘victims’ but who have nonetheless been harmed or suffered loss from criminal 
offending.  
 
The second concern is the question of where the appropriate limit to reparation lies. If the 
scope of the sentence is extended, then some limitation is required so that its application 
does not become open-ended. Where the threshold for reparation ought to lie will be 
examined. An analysis will be made both of the alternative ways to limit reparation, since 
the current definition of ‘victim’ is deemed to be inappropriate, and of the implication of 
these alternatives should such a change be invoked. 
 
  
4 See S Easton and C Piper Sentencing and Punishment: The Quest for Justice (2nd ed, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford 2008) at ch 6. 
5 See generally A von Hirsch Censure and Sanctions (Oxford University Press, New York, 1993). 
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It is important to note that if reparation were extended, the extension would only affect a 
relatively small number of cases where there is no direct victim, but some ‘indirect 
victim’ has nonetheless suffered an identifiable loss and ought to be compensated. 
Alternative mechanisms may also be available in some cases to address this sort of issue. 
For example, where a convicted criminal should receive some pecuniary punishment a 
fine may be imposed;6 or an individual may be subjected to a profit forfeiture order for 
property unlawfully acquired through criminal activity, irrespective of whether there is a 
victim or even any criminal conviction.7 Such mechanisms ultimately focus on 
punishment, rather than compensation. This paper, however, will focus on addressing the 
main issue that was considered by the Supreme Court in Kapa, and reflect on what should 
happen in any cases where some compensation is sought but where there is a barrier to 
bringing any alternative charge.  
 
II Kapa v The Queen 
 
The Supreme Court in Kapa considered whether the sentence of reparation was limited to 
victims of offences. The issue arose in terms of whether reward donors were persons for 
whose benefit a sentence of reparation could be made.8 
 
In 2007, two men burgled the National Army Museum and stole 96 gallantry medals. The 
theft caused a stir throughout the country and the Commissioner of Police offered a 
reward for information or evidence that would lead to the closure of the case and 
recovery of the medals. Two members of the public, Lord Ashcroft and Tom Sturgess, 
offered to provide funding for any reward made. 
 
Mr Comesky, an Auckland lawyer, offered the return of the medals in exchange for the 
reward money and the Commissioner agreed. The names of Comesky’s clients were not 
  
6 See Sentencing Act, s 39; and G Hall Hall’s Sentencing (Butterworths, Wellington, 1993) at [SA39.3]. 
7 See Criminal Proceeds (Recovery) Act 2009, s 55. 
8 At [7]. 
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disclosed. This development led to the return of the medals and a reward payment of 
more than $200,000 being made. 
 
James Kapa was one of the two men later arrested and charged with burglary in relation 
to the stolen medals as a result of further police investigation. He pleaded guilty to the 
charge.  Prior to his arrest, Kapa was Comesky’s client and had received $100,000 of the 
reward money. Kapa accepted that he and his accomplice had used Comesky “to broker a 
deal to return the medals for a sum of the reward money”.9 
 
In the District Court, Kapa was sentenced to imprisonment and a reparation sentence of 
$100,000 was imposed.10 His appeal against the reparation sentence was rejected in the 
Court of Appeal.11 Kapa then appealed to the Supreme Court, where the Court analysed 
the question of whether the imposition of reparation complied with the requirements of 
the Sentencing Act (SA), s 32.12  
 
The issue that arose is whether that “person” in s 32(1) who suffers loss, damage or harm 
is limited to the victim of the crime, or whether any person who has suffered loss, 
damage or harm from the offending can benefit from a reparation sentence.13 The 
Crown’s argument that any “person” could potentially be the recipient of a sentence of 
reparation under s 32 was rejected.14 The majority of the Supreme Court held that only 
victims can benefit from reparation, so Ashcroft and Sturgess were not eligible to have 
reparation invoked in their favour.15 
 
The judgment brings to light the issues created by this limit on the reparation sentence. 
Only victims can be the beneficiaries of a sentence of reparation under s 32. Section 4 of 
SA provides that, for the purposes of the Act, a victim is “a person against whom an 
  
9 At [4]. 
10 R v Kapa DC Auckland CRI-2008-083-2487, 26 August 2010 at [27]. 
11 Kapa v R [2011] NZCA 504 at [40]. 
12 At [6]. 
13 At [7]. 
14 At [11]. 
15 At [11] and [36]. 
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offence is committed, or a person who, through or by means of an offence, suffers injury, 
or loss or damage to property”.16 Those outside this definition of ‘victim’ must look to 
other areas of the law if they are to be compensated for their loss. Without a separate civil 
action being taken by an individual or group, the loss resulting from the criminal conduct 
remains a burden of the person harmed by the offending. Ideally, reparation should fulfil 
its role as a loss-shifting mechanism, so that the loss resulting from the crime in question 
is transferred to the offender.17 This will not always be possible if reparation remains 
narrow in scope, shifting the burden of the loss only where a direct victim can be 
identified according to the restrictive definition. 
 
In the light of the result in Kapa, this paper proposes an extension of the criminal law so 
that any loss suffered by indirect victims through or by means of criminal offending can 
be appropriately recognised and mitigated by the reparation sentence.  
 
III Meaning of ‘Victim’ 
 
It is crucial first to understand who is considered to be a victim for reparation purposes.  
 
Under s 4 of the Act:18 
 
Victim— 
[(a) means— 
(i) a person against whom an offence is committed by another person; and 
(ii) a person who, through, or by means of, an offence committed by another person, 
suffers physical injury, or loss of, or damage to, property; and 
(iii) a parent or legal guardian of a child, or of a young person, who falls within 
subparagraph (i) or subparagraph (ii), unless that parent or guardian is charged with 
  
16 Sentencing Act, s4, definition of “victim”, paras (a)(i) and (a)(ii). 
17 New Zealand Law Commission Compensating Crime Victims (NZLC R121, 2010) at 2.11; see also N 
Walker Sentencing: Theory, Law and Practice (London, Butterworths, 1985) at 8.36; and A Ashworth 
Sentencing and Criminal Justice (3rd ed, Butterworths, London, 2000) at 75-77. 
18 Sentencing Act, s 4. 
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the commission of, or convicted or found guilty of, or pleads guilty to, the offence 
concerned; and 
(iv) a member of the immediate family of a person who, as a result of an offence 
committed by another person, dies or is incapable, unless that member is charged 
with the commission of, or convicted or found guilty of, or pleads guilty to, the 
offence concerned;] 
 
This definition is similar to others found in recently enacted criminal legislation. For 
example, it does not greatly differ from that in the Victims’ Rights Act 2002 (VRA).19 
Other statutes that define ‘victim’ in substantially the same way include the Parole Act 
2002 (PA), the Prisoners’ and Victims’ Claims Act 2005 (PVCA) and the Criminal 
Procedure Act 2011 (CPA). These statutes all, to some extent, recognise the interests of 
victims of crime. 
 
The VRA includes within ‘victim’ those who are directly affected by the offence, the 
parent or guardian of the person directly affected if that person is under 17 years old, and 
finally, it includes a person’s immediate family where the person directly affected has 
died or is otherwise incapable.20 Additionally, the VRA allows a wider interpretation of 
‘victim’ for the purpose of certain provisions. For example, a person suffering emotional 
harm is a victim for the purposes of ss 7-8, dealing with victims’ treatment and access to 
services. Similarly, a person can be treated as a victim for victim impact statement 
purposes if the prosecutor considers it appropriate to do so, even if that person is not the 
victim, offender nor the accused.21 Only two requirements must be satisfied in that case: 
the person must be disadvantaged by an offence and he or she must be able to provide 
information about the effects of the offence.22 The PVCA has substantially the same 
definition of ‘victim’ as the SA,23 while the CPA takes the VRA s 4 definition.24 
  
19 Victims’ Rights Act 2002, s 4; see also B Robertson Adams on Criminal Law – Sentencing (online 
looseleaf ed, Brookers) at SA 4.23.01. 
20 Victims’ Rights Act, s 4. 
21 Victims’ Rights Act, s 20. 
22 Victims’ Rights Act, s 20. 
23 Prisoners’ and Victims’ Claims Act 2005, s 8. 
24 Criminal Procedure Act 2011, s 5. 
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The Parole Act defines ‘victim’ more narrowly than the VRA and SA, limiting the term 
to those who are on the victim notification register.25 However, the Act also includes 
provisions that confer rights to those considered as victims in a much wider sense.26 
These wider provisions include the guiding principles of the Act, where the VRA s 4 
definition of victim is adopted.27 
 
Although there is little difference in the definition of ‘victim’ across these statutes, in 
certain circumstances the term is given wider scope. These victims’ provisions identify 
those who ought to be granted rights by virtue of having their interests violated in some 
way by criminal offending. The legislation also serves as a framework to determine the 
responsibilities of either the state or a particular agency, which is then charged with the 
protection of those rights. Despite this codification of victims’ rights, much of the 
legislation is legally unenforceable,28 and provides more of a normative framework as to 
how victims ought to be treated in the course of criminal justice proceedings. The 
provisions are nonetheless useful to clarify who may be seen as a victim in more general 
terms. Although the definition of ‘victim’ can be extended or adapted in particular 
situations, such provision is not presently made for reparation in s 32. Having an 
extended definition of ‘victim’ for the purpose of a reparation sentence would not be 
unprecedented by virtue of these adapted or extended definitions already enacted for 
other purposes. 
 
IV The Reparation Sentence 
 
The SA establishes the sentence of reparation in New Zealand. Reparation is permitted in 
three circumstances by s 32(1), which reads as follows:29 
 
  
25 Parole Act 2002, s 4. 
26 See Parole Act, ss 43-45, 47, 49-50B. 
27 Parole Act, s 7. 
28 See Victims’ Rights Act, s 10. 
29 Sentencing Act, s 32. 
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32 Sentence of reparation 
(1) A court may impose a sentence of reparation if an offender has, through or by 
means of an offence of which the offender is convicted, caused a person to suffer – 
(a) Loss of or damage to property; or 
(b) Emotional harm; or 
(c) Loss or damage consequential on any emotional or physical harm or loss of, or 
damage to, property. 
 
The majority in Kapa held that s 32 is connected in such a way to the s 4 SA definition of 
victim so that only victims are able to be beneficiaries of a reparation sentence.30 This 
significantly limits the sentence to the extent that even those who have suffered loss, the 
reward donors in Kapa, are unable to be compensated for their losses by means of 
reparation.31 
 
Having already identified where the current provisions may be falling short of providing 
compensation in some circumstances, it is best now to look at reparation in terms of 
where there may be scope to extend its application to better address situations where 
compensation should be made available. A proper analysis can be made through the 
rationales of the reparation sentence. These rationales can be examined in the light of the 
historical enactment and judicial interpretation of reparation, before looking at how the 
current sentence is interpreted in comparison. 
 
Sentencing can be analysed with regard to the criminal justice process as a whole. As a 
starting point, the criminalisation of behaviour ensures that offenders suffer public 
censure for their wrongful action through conviction.32 When conduct is determined to be 
criminal, Parliament is authorising the imposition of punishment to deprive the offender 
of some right.33 When a sentence is being considered, the offender has already been 
  
30 At [11]. 
31 See Kapa v R, above n 1 at [36]. 
32 RA Duff Answering for Crime: Responsibility and Liability in the Criminal Law (Hart, Oxford, 2007) at 
123. 
33 A Ashworth Principles of Criminal Law (4th ed, Oxford University Press, 2003) at 19; see also AP 
Simester and WJ Brookbanks Principles of Criminal Law (Brookers, Wellington, 2012) at ch 1.2.2. 
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prosecuted for and convicted of a crime. It is then appropriate to make right any harm 
caused by the offender by invoking a punishment to express “moral condemnation” 
through the judicial power to sentence.34 A sentence might strip the offender of gain 
made through the criminal activity, appease any violations of interests, or otherwise 
punish the wrongdoer.35  
 
Any punishment imposed must be justified.36 Penological principles provide “the 
justifications of punishment”.37 Widespread recognition of reparation as part of 
punishment developed from the 1980s. During that time, it was noted in Britain “that 
room should be found within the criminal justice process for some kind of reparation or 
reconciliation”.38 This development in sentencing was acknowledged as a “shift from 
principles of punishment, deterrence and rehabilitation to the principle of undoing the 
harm done by means such as restitution, compensation and community service.”39 The 
reparation sentence with its restitutionary focus is tied to this ideology.40 
 
The SA establishes the purposes of sentencing in New Zealand.41 
 
7 Purposes of sentencing or otherwise dealing with offenders 
(1) The purposes for which a court may sentence or otherwise deal with an offender 
are— 
(a) to hold the offender accountable for harm done to the victim and the community 
by the offending; or 
  
34 Easton and Piper, above n 4, at 4; see also Joel Feinberg ‘The Expressive Function of Punishment’ in A 
Duff and D Garland (eds) A Reader on Punishment (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1994) at 71. 
35 For further discussion see DA Thomas Sentencing: The Basic Principles [1967] Crim LR 455 and 503; 
Clarkson and Keating Criminal Law (6th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2007) at 26; and A Ashworth, 
above n 17, at 3. 
36 A Ashworth, above n 17, at 61. 
37 Easton and Piper, above n 4, at 20. 
38 D Smith, H Blagg, and N Derricourt “Mediation in South Yorkshire” (1988), British Journal of 
Criminology Vol 28(3) 378. 
39 E Stockdale and K Devlin Sentencing (1st ed, Waterlow Publishers, London, 1987) at 36. 
40 See Easton and Piper, above n 4, at ch 6. 
41 Sentencing Act, s 7. 
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(b) to promote in the offender a sense of responsibility for, and an acknowledgment 
of, that harm; or 
(c) to provide for the interests of the victim of the offence; or 
(d) to provide reparation for harm done by the offending; or 
(e) to denounce the conduct in which the offender was involved; or 
(f) to deter the offender or other persons from committing the same or a similar 
offence; or 
(g) to protect the community from the offender; or 
(h) to assist in the offender's rehabilitation and reintegration; or 
(i) a combination of 2 or more of the purposes in paragraphs (a) to (h). 
 
These codify the traditional sentencing purposes, allowing judges the flexibility to 
determine the particular purpose of the sentence to be imposed. Of note in terms of 
reparation is subs (1)(b), (c) and (d) of s 7. A court may sentence an offender to provide 
for the interests of the victim under s 7(1)(c). This should be read with s 7(1)(b), 
promoting responsibility for harm. If an offender acknowledges the harm arising from the 
commission of the offence, this will often act as a mitigating factor to reduce the 
sentence. In a system based primarily on just deserts, as New Zealand arguably is, 
sentences will not be imposed merely in order to promote this sense of responsibility or to 
provide for the interest of victims.42 Just deserts refers to punishment relating to the 
offender’s culpability and justified by retributivist principles.43  The interests of victims 
are relevant, but sentences should not be imposed based on satisfying the victim.44 The 
Court of Appeal determined that interpreting s 7(1)(c) as indicating that “heavy sentences 
should be imposed so the victims may, personally, feel vindicated” is the incorrect 
approach and “cannot have been the legislature’s intent”.45 Subsections 7(1)(b) and 
7(1)(c) are based on restorative justice principles, where the focus is on “the restoration 
of the victim, the community and the offender to their former position” by remedying the 
harm or loss that results from the offending.46  
  
42 B Robertson, above n 19, at SA7.02. 
43 See Easton and Piper, above n 4, at 20, 23 and ch 2.5. 
44 B Robertson, above n 19, at SA7.02 
45 R v Tuiletefuga 25/09/2003, CA205/03 at [23]. 
46 B Robertson, above n 19, at SA7.02. 
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An exception to this comes in terms of the sentence of reparation, which is underpinned 
by the purpose under s 7(1)(d) of providing reparation for harm done. There is no explicit 
reference here to harm done to victims. Since the interests of victims are already provided 
for by s 7(1)(c), a reparation sentence might be intended to more generally provide 
reparation for harm done, in a way not limited to direct victims. This interpretation is 
based on a direct reading of the sentencing purposes. Despite this literal interpretation 
being possible, the courts have opted to read in the requirement of a victim for a 
reparation sentence, holding that the purpose of s 7(1)(d) provides only for reparation to 
the victims of offending. This determination, affirmed by the Supreme Court in Kapa, 
resulted in the reward donors being unable to receive reparation for the monetary loss 
they suffered as a result of Kapa’s criminal offending. 
 
A Historical Development of Reparation 
 
Traditionally, the criminal law has not been formulated to be reparative or compensatory 
in nature. Crimes have been seen as “public wrongs against the community at large, 
resulting in punishment to express society’s disapproval, to deter future offending, and to 
provide community protection”.47 The theory of retributivism provides one digression 
from the traditional approach: it “links punishment according to the desert or culpability 
of the individual” and “matches the severity of the punishment to the seriousness of the 
crime”.48 Reparation has also featured more generally within informal justice practices, 
whereby the community has sought to take disputes out of the formal legal process, away 
from adversarial procedures.49 The recent restorative justice ‘movement’ has seen 
reparation for harm become a primary concern with its focus on restoring harmony 
between the victim, offender and the community.50 In New Zealand, some possibility for 
compensation in the course of criminal proceedings was allowed through the 
compensation provisions in the Criminal Code Act 1893, and the Crimes Acts of 1908 
  
47 New Zealand Law Commission, above n 17, at [3.4]. 
48 Easton and Piper, above n 4, at 8 and 55. 
49 See R Matthews Informal Justice? (Sage, London, 1988) at 99. 
50 Easton and Piper, above n 4, at 6.1.2. 
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and 1961.51 These were seen as compensation orders, separate to sentencing. The orders 
were little used, so compensation was afforded only in very limited circumstances.52  
 
In recent years there has been a growing political need to recognise the victim’s role 
within the criminal justice process.53 With a developing appreciation that “each criminal 
case involves more than the government versus the defendant. There is another party with 
a burning interest”.54 Accordingly, it can be reasoned that an important goal of both the 
criminal justice system and of sentencing ought to be justice to victims.55 The Declaration 
of Basic Principles of Justice for Victim and Abuse of Power furthered this victim-
focused development on a global scale.56 This greater emphasis on the needs of victims 
and a subsequent focus on compensation from the 1980s paved the way for a growing 
number of restorative criminal justice schemes, whereby, amongst other functions, 
custodial sentences gave way to sentences to make reparation.57 The focus was taken 
away from the offender’s fault; punishment was more clearly related to the harm to the 
victim, and centred on rendering justice to both victims and offenders.58 It must be noted 
that the approach of having too narrow a focus on victims has been criticised,59 and one 
response to the increased involvement of victims in the criminal justice process has been 
to recognise that “the victim’s interest is part of the public interest but only part”.60 
 
  
51 Criminal Code Act 1893, s 419; Crimes Act 1908, s 449; and Crimes Act 1961, s 403. 
52 Kapa v R, above n 1, at [81]; Penal Policy Review Committee Report of the Penal Policy Committee 
(presented to the Minister of Justice, 1981) at [351]. 
53 Easton and Piper, above n 4, at ch 6.4.1. 
54 R Davis, A Lurigio and W Skogan (eds) Victims of Crime  (2nd ed, Thousand Oaks, CA, Sage, 1997) at 
vii. 
55 A Ashworth Sentencing and Criminal Justice (2nd ed, Butterworths, London 1995) at 73. 
56 Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims and Abuse of Power, United Nations (29 
November 1985), Part A. 
57 Andrew Ashworth, above n 17, at 76; Easton and Piper, above n 4, at ch 6.3.1. 
58 B Smith and S Hillenbrand (1997) ‘Making Victims Whole Again’ in R Davis, A Lurigio and W Skogan 
(eds) (1997) Victims of Crime (2nd ed, Thousand Oaks, CA, Sage) at 250. 
59 See Easton and Piper, above n 4, at ch 6.5.1. 
60 Andrew Ashworth (1993) ‘Victim Impact Statements and Sentencing’ Crimi LR, at 503. 
16  
 
Reparation as a sentence was first introduced in the Criminal Justice Act.61 The 
provisions resulted from a recommendation that reparation ought to provide a regime to 
compensate for “all direct or indirect loss or damage suffered by any person as a result of 
the conduct giving rise to the proceedings in which the offender was convicted”.62 The 
sentence was extended from property losses to cover emotional harm in 1987.63 It was 
advised that the courts “should lean towards making reparation orders in every 
appropriate case”.64 A presumption in favour of reparation was enacted65 that was 
implemented by the courts66 and further reflected by the other related provisions.67 
Reparation in the Criminal Justice Act could be broadly interpreted and imposed where 
the court was “satisfied that any act or omission that constituted the offence caused any 
loss of or damage to any property of another”.68 This broad application was limited only 
by the statutory exclusion of “any loss or damage of a consequential nature”.69 The 
current reparation sentence followed on from this provision. The sentence is intended to 
provide “a simple and speedy means of compensating those who suffer loss from criminal 
activities”,70 averting the need to separately seek a civil remedy. The reparation sentence 
is enforced as if it were a fine. However, reparation is “compensatory in nature”,71 and 
“conceptually different from the punitive purpose of a fine”.72 Reparation is intended to 
reinstate those who have suffered loss through criminal offending to their original 
position.73 
 
  
61 Criminal Justice Act 1985, s 22. 
62 Penal Policy Review Committee, above n 52, at [351]. 
63 Criminal Justice Amendment Act (No 3) 1987, s 4(1). 
64 Penal Policy Review Committee, above n 52, at [355]. 
65 Criminal Justice Act, s 11. 
66 R v O'Rourke [1990] 1 NZLR 155 (CA) at 158. 
67 See Criminal Justice Act, s 22(7)-(8). 
68 Criminal Justice Act, s 22(1). 
69 Criminal Justice Act, s 22(5). 
70 R v O’Rourke, above n 66, at 158. 
71 Police v Ferrier 18/11/03 HC Auckland CRI-2003-404-195, at [15]. 
72 B Robertson, above n 19, at SA 32.04. 
73 R v Donaldson CA227/06, 2 October 2006 at [34]. 
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The suite of victims-rights based legislation that was enacted post-2000 further signalled 
recognition of the role of victims’ interests in the criminal justice system.74 Collectively, 
the legislative changes suggested that a more restorative or reparative approach would be 
taken, with particular regard to the victims of crime. It must be noted that although these 
Acts often confer unenforceable rights,75 they do establish, to varying degrees, who ought 
to be considered as victims and grant these people some form of rights in recognition of 
their loss suffered. This legislative development initially appeared to allow greater 
recognition and rectification of harms that result from criminal offending. However, in 
strictly limiting eligibility for certain rights to direct victims, like the right to a reparation 
sentence, an arbitrary line has been drawn. Awarding reparation for harm resulting from 
criminal conduct is now based on whether or not the person at a loss fits the s 4 SA 
definition of ‘victim’. The definition does not encompass all those who have suffered loss 
or harm as a result of criminal conduct, excluding from its ambit indirect victims of 
criminal offending.  An unsatisfactory void has thus been created through this limitation 
to the sentence. 
 
B Reparation Case Law 
 
It is helpful to examine how reparation has been interpreted and applied from its 
inception to gain an understanding of its proper scope and how previous developments 
have led to the current application of the sentence. Since the sentence was introduced,76 
reparation in terms of harm suffered in connection to an offence has been given a wide 
interpretation by the courts. That is, until the Supreme Court’s decision in Kapa.  
 
Tipping J in the High Court in Lovatt v Police said that the sentence should be given a 
“liberal interpretation consistent with the spirit of reparation being ordered in all proper 
circumstances”.77 The sentence requires the loss or damage to be suffered “through or by 
  
74 See Victims’ Rights Act; Parole Act; Prisoners’ and Victims’ Claims Act; and Criminal Procedure Act. 
75 See Victims’ Rights Act, s 10. 
76 Criminal Justice Act, s 22. 
77 Lovatt v Police HC Christchurch AP156/9, 2 August 1991. 
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means of the offence”.78 Tipping J held in Wilmot v Police that it was sufficient that the 
conduct had “materially contributed” to the loss or damage.79 In Wilson v Police Gallen J 
determined that reparation could be ordered where a reasonable person could reasonably 
foresee the kind of harm or loss that occurred as a result of the offence.80 This 
requirement is to be interpreted in a broad, commonsense manner in light of the 
compensatory nature of reparation and “resort to refined causation arguments is not to be 
encouraged” in determining whether there is sufficient association between the loss and 
the offending.81 The English courts have taken a similar, non-technical approach to 
reparation.82 
 
The Court of Appeal in R v Gill reluctantly held that the loss suffered was partly of a 
“consequential nature” to the offending,83 and the relevant s 22 provision did not allow 
for reparation to be ordered in those circumstances.84 The law has since been amended so 
that reparation for consequential loss or damage is now provided for under s 32(1)(c).85 It 
was argued by the Crown in Kapa that the reward donors suffered consequential loss for 
which reparation ought to be awarded.86 The court in R v Ebdell held that the New 
Zealand Post (the Post) could recover its costs of restoring stolen property to the intended 
recipients as consequential loss.87 The majority in Kapa determined that this case was 
correctly decided but that it is distinguishable from Kapa on its facts, in that the Post’s 
status differs from that of a reward donor.88 The Court based the distinction on ownership 
rights; the Post was the owner of the stolen property at the time of the theft, whereas the 
reward donors have no ownership title over the stolen medals. This indicates that a person 
with a legal or equitable interest in property who suffers consequential loss may be 
  
78 Sentencing Act, s 32(1). 
79 Wilmot v Police HC Dunedin AP25/96, 15 July 1996.  
80 Wilson v Police HC Napier, AP60/94, 13 February 1995. 
81 R v Donaldson, above n 73, at [36]. 
82 Bond v Chief Constable of Kent [1983] 1 All ER 456 at 459. 
83 R v Gill (1992) 10 CRNZ 632 (CA) at 639. 
84 Criminal Justice Act, s 22(5). 
85 Sentencing Act, s32(1)(c). 
86 At [9]. 
87 R v Ebdell [2009] NZCA 536. 
88 At [35]. 
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entitled to reparation, while someone with a mere “use” interest may not. On this 
analysis, since the reward donors had no ownership interest in the stolen medals, they 
could not be victims for reparation purposes.  
 
The preceding broad interpretations of the reparation provisions culminated in the 
decision of Kapa with the Court taking a decidedly narrower approach to the application 
of the sentence. Despite Kapa receiving a pecuniary benefit from the offending at the 
burden of the reward donors, the majority determined that reparation is unavailable to 
benefit the reward donors. Only victims may recover for consequential loss or damage 
under s 32(1)(c), and reward donors cannot be classified as such.89 The reward donors 
remain deprived of the money, while Kapa is able to keep the $100,000 as ‘earnings’ 
from the theft of the medals. The injustice in this outcome begs reconsideration of the 
appropriateness of limiting reparation to direct victims as defined by s 4, and the question 
of whether the scope of the sentence should be extended. 
 
In the light of this examination of reparation and its related elements, the sentence should 
not be restricted to a predetermined category of persons who are labelled the direct 
‘victims’ of crimes. The sentence was developed as an efficient means to provide 
compensation for harms resulting from criminal offending.90 Compensation as part of 
criminal proceedings creates a fluid and cohesive scheme of recovery for those suffering 
loss or harm. Notwithstanding the recent legislative efforts to recognise victims’ rights, in 
so limiting reparation, a considerable vacuum is created within this area of the law. 
Making reparation available only to direct victims takes away from the underlying broad 
compensatory aims of the sentence, and introduces difficulty in circumstances where a 
person has suffered through criminal activity but is not considered to be a victim under 
the s 4 definition. This way, the law is neglecting a group of people, who, despite having 
their interests violated by criminal offending, are left with no recourse to reparation by 
virtue of not fitting within the prescribed definition of ‘victim’. 
 
  
89 Kapa v R, above n 1, at [15]. 
90 R v O’Rourke, above n 66, at 158. 
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The Supreme Court’s approach in Kapa, limiting compensatory rights to narrowly 
defined ‘victims’, overlooks the importance of mitigating the actual harm that results 
from the criminal offending. Those who have suffered loss or harm as a result of crime 
are not adequately compensated. Instead, the focus has narrowed so that only some 
people suffering loss in particular situations have recourse to rights and benefits as part of 
the criminal justice procedure. Although a limit is necessary, restricting eligibility for 
reparation to the particular definition of ‘victim’ confines the sentence too narrowly.  
 
In the rest of this paper, it is argued that the current restriction on reparation is wrong for 
those cases where there is somebody who is not the direct victim of a charged offence, 
but who has suffered clearly manifested harm or loss because of the offending. The 
victim limitation renders the sentence of reparation deficient in giving effect to its 
purpose and an appropriate scope of application. Since the criminal behaviour has 
resulted in another’s loss, the equilibrium should be restored by some mechanism, so that 
the burden of loss created by the offending is shifted back to the offender.  
 
The issue arising from the Supreme Court decision in Kapa, where the person seeking 
compensation is not eligible for reparation by virtue of not being a ‘victim’, will only 
apply in a relatively small number of cases. Nonetheless, legal recognition and 
compensation for the harm suffered by this other group of people is certainly required. 
These indirect victims should not necessarily be afforded all the rights of the 
conventional victim, nor should those ordinarily charged with upholding victims’ rights 
necessarily have the same extensive responsibilities for them. It is, however, argued that 
by virtue of being able to demonstrate loss suffered as a result of the offending, there 
should be some legal response so that compensation can be made available to this other 
group of people. The reward donors in Kapa suffered an identifiable loss associated with 
Kapa’s criminal offending, and ought to be compensated for that loss through a 
reparation sentence. As reward donors, however, they cannot benefit from reparation, as 
they do not fit the required definition of victim.91 Although it may be unsurprising that 
the reward donors are not considered victims, they might “consider themselves as people 
  
91 Sentencing Act, s 4. 
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who have lost money through or by means of the offending. That is in fact the inquiry to 
be made”.92 The resulting injustice from this case should not go unnoticed, and should, in 
some way, be rectified. 
 
Addressing this issue does not necessitate a vast extension of ‘victim’ or the adoption of 
an entirely new definition to encompass this other group of people; these options may be 
considered, but such a large-scale transformation might then impact too greatly on other 
areas of the law. Since the issue only affects a relatively small number of cases, it is 
appropriate to consider more measured changes to the reparation sentence, which will 
recognise the rights of these indirect victims with minimal impact on other criminal 
justice provisions.  
 
V  Suitability of the Criminal Law 
 
Before exploring any possibilities in terms of how to properly limit reparation while 
compensating indirect victims, another issue must be addressed. The concern is whether a 
reparation sentence at criminal law is the appropriate means to recognise and rectify the 
harm suffered by this other group of people. Other legal mechanisms, particularly within 
the civil jurisdiction, may be available to compensate this type of loss in many cases. 
Extending the criminal law in this area of sentencing may prove to be too large an 
impingement on individual rights, rendering the scope of the offender’s responsibility 
unreasonably wide, especially in light of any other avenues for address that may be 
available. It is important to briefly consider alternative methods of redress, and, most 
importantly, to understand how they impact on possible developments of the current 
reparation provisions.  
 
Civil law actions can compensate individuals, and could be available in place of a 
reparation sentence in some circumstances, depending on the particular facts of a case. 
Such actions include, but are in no way limited to, applications under the Criminal 
Proceeds (Recovery) Act 2009, or actions in tort or contract law.  
  
92 Kapa v R, above n 1, at [116]. 
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On the facts available within the existing judgments of Kapa, no assertion can be made 
that the reward donors have a civil claim either in tort or contract against Kapa for the 
reward money. The majority suggested that the reward donors might, however, have 
recourse to compensation as claimants in a civil law action.93 Although reparation is 
unavailable, Kapa could be stripped of the gain he received through a civil suit by means 
of the Criminal Proceeds (Recovery) Act 2009. Despite debate that such recovery is 
criminal in nature,94 the legislation establishes a civil law process to recover proceeds of 
criminal offences, separate to the criminal proceedings.95 Without a civil action being 
commenced, it remains uncertain whether this Act would serve to wholly compensate the 
reward donors in this case.  
 
Despite the prospect of a civil claim being available to the reward donors, it is argued 
below that the criminal law can better address the loss suffered by the indirect victims. 
Through an analysis of the practical considerations, and by reference to the underlying 
nature and values of reparation as well as by analogy to other areas of the criminal justice 
process, the argument is reinforced that a reparation sentence is the more suitable 
mechanism to provide such relief.  
 
First, from a practical standpoint, criminal procedure allows for an effective, cohesive, 
and streamlined process of recovery. Reparation serves as compensation, and is awarded 
at the conclusion of the state’s action against the offender as part of the punishment for 
wrongdoing. This avoids the time-consuming and costly need for those burdened by 
criminal activity to independently pursue other avenues of compensation. Denying 
indirect victims the benefit of a reparation sentence forces those already disadvantaged to 
advance a case through the taxing civil law process,96 in the hope that it will result in 
some compensation for the initial damage suffered. This can be a heavy burden to 
  
93
 At [38]. 
94 See Liz Campbell “The Recovery of “Criminal” Assets in New Zealand, Ireland and England: Fighting 
Organised and Serious Crime in the Civil Realm” [2010] VUWLR, vol 41. 
95 Criminal Proceeds (Recovery) Act, ss 10, 15 and 16. 
96 See Kapa v R, above n 1, at [38]. 
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discharge, and the inherent risk of success carried with the civil claim may be restrictive 
in terms of whether or not an individual will eventually decide to pursue such a 
compensation claim. Denying a reparation sentence may also be prohibitive where 
compensation for a smaller amount is being sought. The possible cost of civil 
proceedings might outweigh the original loss, meaning that such proceedings may not be 
practicable, especially for those already disadvantaged by criminal conduct. Where there 
is a smaller claim for compensation, there may be other avenues to provide the relief 
sought. Such mechanisms might include, for example, action involving disputes tribunals 
or redress through alternative dispute resolution techniques.97 The claimant must still pass 
any hurdles required by the particular mechanism, and may ultimately find that he or she 
cannot fit the criteria to bring the claim, or that there is some other barrier to bringing the 
claim. This is in contrast to the reparation sentence, where the offender has been 
convicted of the crime and compensation through reparation may be considered alongside 
other punishments as part of the overall sentencing process. 
 
Additionally, extending reparation to include indirect victims is consistent with the core 
values that underlie sentencing and the particular aims of the sentence, as distinct from 
the core principles of criminal conviction. The relevant considerations here include the 
compensatory nature of reparation, its role as a loss-shifting mechanism and its judicially-
sanctioned wide and liberal interpretation. Such extension would ensure recognition of 
the rights of those suffering loss or harm through criminal conduct, and would mitigate 
this harm to the greatest extent possible.  
 
Lastly, the criminal law already recognises the rights and interests of third parties in some 
areas. These interested parties are not considered ‘victims’ of criminal offending; nor are 
they the offender, a claimant, or a party to the legal action. The criminal law has made 
such provision notably in the area of disclosure requirements and evidential rules. Under 
the Criminal Disclosure Act 2008 for example, the defendant can make an application for 
non-party disclosure, which extends disclosure obligations to material held by an 
  
97 See generally R Matthews Informal Justice?, above n 49; and Easton and Piper, above n 4, at ch 6. 
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independent third party.98 With such provisions in mind, a better evaluation of reparation 
can be made. The reparation sentence could accordingly be extended so that third-party 
rights and interests can be similarly addressed in these questions of compensation. 
 
Modifying the existing reparation sentence is the better way to ensure that all loss 
associated with criminal behaviour is appropriately mitigated. Any alternatives would see 
compensation within the criminal law remaining unavailable to this other group of 
indirect victims, so that those suffering loss need to pursue other, more taxing, actions in 
the hope of redress. 
 
VI  Possible Limits to Reparation 
 
Having determined that the criminal law ought to be the mechanism to address the 
interests of these indirect victims, the question then becomes where the line should be 
drawn in providing legal recognition and the right to compensation. If the current 
definition of victim inappropriately limits reparation, another way of establishing who 
ought to be able to benefit from the sentence must be devised. The law cannot allow 
compensation for harms to an endless number of people or indefinite section of society.  
 
Alternative limitations can be formulated by changing who is considered to be a victim: 
either by extending the current definition, creating a particular definition for reparation 
purposes, or by leaving open who may be considered a victim so that it is determined in 
the specific circumstances. A contentious alternative could be to remove the requirement 
to have a victim for reparation entirely. A new threshold to limit reparation might then be 
introduced; the threshold could be based on the harm that results from the offending, 
based on the culpability of the offender, or it could be a specific requirement fixed on the 
remoteness of the loss or harm. These options are considered in the following paragraphs. 
A Changing the Definition of ‘Victim’ 
 
  
98 Criminal Disclosure Act 2008, s 24(5). 
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The s 4 definition of victim could be extended to include a much wider range of people, 
so that anyone disadvantaged by an offence is considered a victim. The reward donors 
would then be eligible to receive reparation for their pecuniary loss. Similar wording to 
define the scope of ‘victim’ can be found in the VRA.99 An amendment to broaden the 
definition of “victim” had previously been suggested to specifically include every 
“complainant in relation to an offence”.100 This definition was, however, replaced by the 
narrower “person against whom an offence is committed”.101 Extending the definition of 
victim for all purposes might be objectionable, since it may have broad implications 
affecting other provisions of the SA that rely on this definition. For example, certain 
aggravating and mitigating factors for sentencing take into account the rights, interests 
and status of the ‘victim’.102 If a broader approach to the term ‘victim’ is taken, there may 
be a direct impact on the actual imposition of other sentences beyond reparation; for 
example, if the extended definition is used for consideration of the s 9 factors.103 Such an 
extension may have too negative an effect if we consider that other provisions, which rely 
on the definition of victim, may be more appropriately executed with the current, 
narrower definition.  
 
Otherwise, a definition of victim may be devised specifically for the sentence of 
reparation. This would be broader than the s 4 definition and include anyone associated 
with the criminal offending who suffers some loss. Having a specific definition of victim 
for a particular purpose is not unparalleled. Such an approach would be comparable to the 
VRA, with its varied applications of the term ‘victim’.104 The current definition could be 
retained with a supplementary definition provided for reparation. For example, following 
the current ‘victim’ definition, the provision might read: “In addition, for the purposes of 
s 32, any person who has suffered loss or damage that is in some way related to the 
criminal offending may be considered a victim.” Such a contained extension may be the 
  
99 Victims’ Rights Act, s 20. 
100 Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill 2001 (148-2), cl 4(a)(i) in relation to the definition of “victim”. 
101 Sentencing Bill 2001 (148-3A), cl 4. 
102 Sentencing Act, s 9. 
103 See Sentencing Act, s 9(1)(f),(fa),(fb),(g),(h)(ii) and s 9(2)(c). 
104 See Victims’ Rights Act, ss 4, 7, 8 and 20. 
26  
 
most suitable way to address the issue; it would ensure that reward donors were eligible 
to benefit, but it would not be too far-reaching so as to impact directly on other provisions 
that require consideration of the term ‘victim’.  
 
The definition of victim could also be left open, and utmost discretion allowed as part of 
the sentencing process to determine whether a person suffering loss has been victimised 
for reparation purposes. Similarly, the VRA currently grants the prosecutor discretion to 
determine whether a person is a victim for the purposes of victim impact statements.105 
This flexible approach avoids pre-determining who a victim can be, so there is scope to 
recognise those who should have their interests protected in the particular circumstances. 
Provision of this sort for reparation may be contentious due to the wide discretion it 
would confer, the lack of certainty it could create, and the opportunity for inconsistencies 
to develop in its application. The discretion granted could be widely and liberally 
exercised, so appropriate restrictions on this power would need to be place. For example, 
those sanctioned to make this determination should be limited to certain persons with a 
degree of expertise and some mandatory considerations should also be included to guide 
the determination of whether a particular person is a victim; such guidelines could be 
derived from the sentencing principles earlier identified. The line might otherwise 
become blurred between allowing judicial discretion to find a just outcome in certain fact 
scenarios and allowing free exercise of discretion so that judicial decisions are based 
upon broad policy determinations that ought to be left to Parliament. The rule of law 
involves judicial decisions being taken openly and by reference to standards declared in 
advance.106 The inherent lack of certainty created by leaving the definition of ‘victim’ 
open could be problematic in upholding this legal standard, and could lead to an 
inconsistent application of the law. However, with an accumulation of case law, some 
established standards to apply when determining who is a victim could be broadly 
delineated. Although it might be deemed radical, this change would likely result in a 
higher number of just outcomes in the application of reparation as a sentence. 
  
105 Victims’ Rights Act, s 20. 
106 A Ashworth, above n 17, at 62; and see J Raz The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1979) at ch 11. 
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Determining who is a victim could be more fairly and flexibly assessed, so that eligibility 
for reparation could truly be ascertained on a case-by-case basis. 
 
B Removing the Requirement of ‘Victim’ 
 
A more preferable route to ensuring the compensation of those who suffer harm may be 
to stipulate that an award of reparation should depend on the harm done, directly or 
consequentially on the offence, rather than on whether the person harmed is a “victim”. 
An analysis of the harm or loss suffered could directly inform who can be considered a 
beneficiary of reparation. Rather than limiting the sentence to benefit a certain category 
of person, as it is currently restricted to direct victims, it might be available to any person 
who has suffered any sort of identifiable harm associated with the criminal offending. 
The aforementioned discretionary approach involved an analysis of the particular facts 
with a view to determining who can be labelled a ‘victim’ and therefore eligible for 
reparation. This approach, by contrast, removes the victim requirement entirely and 
establishes that if a person or persons can show an identifiable or measurable harm or 
loss, they ought to be compensated in law. In the majority of cases, a pecuniary loss could 
be relatively straightforward to manifest. For example, the reward donors in Kapa can 
point to the $100,000 that they put up as a reward, which ended up being paid to Kapa, as 
the loss they incurred. Having to show the harm or loss could prove more burdensome 
when a person seeks reparation for harm that is not pecuniary. For example, if reparation 
for emotional harm is sought. Although less straightforward to manifest, this requirement 
would not necessarily bar such a claim for compensation. Demonstration of the harm or 
loss suffered could therefore be introduced as the standard to ensure that reparation is 
available to the appropriate range of persons. 
 
Alternatively, the sentence of reparation could be dependent on the culpability of the 
convicted offender. When the offender has subjectively foreseen or even intended the loss 
or harm actually suffered, reparation for that anticipated loss could be appropriate. A 
reparation sentence would depend on the offender’s actual or objective culpability, and it 
would be unnecessary to categorise the person suffering harm as a ‘victim’. Whether the 
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assessment is to be of subjective or objective culpability may depend on the 
circumstances of the case. Kapa and his accomplice did in fact foresee the receipt either 
of some pecuniary benefit or a negotiation of other charges for offending as a result of the 
burglary.107 Receiving a reward was partly the reason for the burglary, and Kapa admitted 
the intention to ask “for a ransom” for the medals.108 Under this culpability-based 
limitation, it would be said that the dominant motivation there for the offending was the 
loss actually suffered by the reward donors, so reparation should be available. 
 
Recourse to particular remoteness or causation formulations is discouraged under the 
traditional approach to reparation. Rather, the viewpoint adopted is that the sentence 
should be approached in a broad commonsense way, to give full effect to its 
compensatory nature.109 However, the ‘victim’ limitation could be dispensed with and 
replaced by an investigation centred on remoteness of the harm. Instead of an analysis 
based on the person suffering loss, the primary consideration would be the harm or loss 
that is directly linked to the offender. Whether reparation is available would depend on 
whether there is a sufficient direct link between the offender and the harm or loss 
suffered, taking into account common law principles of causation.110 In Kapa, the loss of 
the donors’ reward money is directly linked to Kapa. The burglary prompted the medals 
agreement, where the reward donors paid the $100,000 to Kapa, overall, resulting in a 
direct gain for Kapa at the disadvantage of the reward donors. There is no act to break the 
chain of causation between Kapa’s burglary and the reward donor’s payment. 
 
This exploration of alternative limits on reparation is useful to identify how the current 
sentence could be advanced, so that indirect victims also receive compensation in the 
appropriate circumstances. The six alternative limits to reparation proposed above would 
each address this issue and establish a more suitable scope for the sentence.  
 
  
107 At [47]. 
108 R v Kapa, above n 10, at [7] (sentencing notes).  
109
 R v Donaldson, above n 73, at [30]-[35]. 
110 R v Donaldson, above n 73, at [36]. 
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VII Conclusion 
 
Since a legislative amendment to the existing reparation provisions is appropriate to 
address compensation for indirect victims, the best approach is one with minimal impact 
on other areas of the law, considering the issue to be addressed will only be present in a 
relatively small number of cases. Accordingly, the best method would be the second 
adaptation to the ‘victim’ requirement outlined above. This involves introducing an 
additional provision that allows for a wider definition of ‘victim’ to be used for the 
purposes of s 32. The wider supplementary definition would include indirect victims, but 
would be limited in application to the specified reparation provisions. The current 
‘victim’ definition could otherwise remain unaltered. Such a change is consistent with the 
overall compensatory nature of reparation. It is not, however, a radical advancement that 
would make reparation available to too large a category of claimants, or have any 
unnecessary impact on other areas of the law. 
 
In the case of Kapa, with such a provision, the reward donors would be eligible to receive 
reparation from Kapa for the $100,000 reward payment, as they suffered loss resulting 
from Kapa’s crime. This would serve to restore the imbalance created by Kapa’s criminal 
offending. The restoration would occur inherently as part of the criminal justice process 
and no further action outside of this would be required ensure that the reward donors 
were availed of their loss. Such legislative change to reparation would therefore lead to 
what is irrefutably the most just outcome in this case, and allow for reparation to be 
considered in any other similarly appropriate cases. 
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